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COMMENTS
Directing The Verdict in Favor of the Party With the Burden of Proof
The North Carolina Supreme Court recently added another deci-
sion to the growing body of case law interpreting the state's new federal-
like rules of civil procedure. The issue presented in Cutts v. Casey' was
whether the party with the burden of proof was entitled to a directed
verdict in his favor under rule 50.2 On the facts of the case the court
determined that the directed verdict was not warranted. The majority
opinion went beyond the facts presented, however, and engaged in a
discussion of the general propriety of directing a verdict in favor of a
proponent. The opinion expressed doubt as to whether rule 50 would
ever authorize such a procedure but grudgingly conceded that there
might be some situations, to be identified in later cases, in which the
trial judge could appropriately resolve a controversy in favor of the
party with the burden of proof as a matter of law.3
Cutts illustrates the general judicial attitude toward a proponent's
motion for a directed verdict or a judgment non obstante veredicto.
Such motions are regarded as distinct from motions for directed verdicts
against the party with the burden of proof and have traditionally been
less available than have the converse procedures. This disparate treat-
ment has little theoretical validity. Whichever party moves for a resolu-
tion of the case as a matter of law, the ultimate question is always
whether reasonable minds could reach any other conclusion. And the
law suffers no less when the party with the burden of proof loses because
of jury prejudice than when he wins for the same reason. This is not to
say that the motions for directed verdicts of the respective parties are
identical. If the movant is the party not shouldered with the burden of
proving his case, his motion will succeed if his opponent's evidence is
so insufficient that no reasonable man could render a verdict for the
opponent. On the other hand, if the movant has the burden of persua-
'278 N.C. 390, 180 S.E.2d 297 (1971). Cutts is analyzed in Louis, A Survey of Decisions Under
the New North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 N.C.L. REv. 729, 746-54 (1972).
2N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-1, Rule 50 (1969). The precise issue presented in Cutts was whether
the granting of the proponent's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was appropriate.
The court, however, treated that motion as if it had been a motion for a directed verdict. This
comment will also treat the two motions as identical since they are so closely analogous. Moreover,
much of what is said here is applicable to similar procedures such as the demurrer to the evidence.
-278 N.C. at 421, 180 S.E.2d at 314.
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sion, his motion can succeed only if the evidence is so overwhelmingly
in his favor that no reasonable man could find for the adverse party.'
The consequence of this difference is that a verdict will less often be
directed in favor of the party with the burden of proof than against him.
Clearly, however, the difference can justify neither an absolute prohibi-
tion nor a curtailment of the availability of directed verdicts in favor of
the party with the burden of proof.
In the past fifteen years5 all courts considering the question have
apparently come to agree with the above conclusion, at least to the
extent that no case has completely banned directed verdicts in favor of
the party with the burden of proof. Nonetheless, there is considerable
disagreement among jurisdictions as to what situations give rise to the
duty of the trial judge to direct a verdict in favor of the proponent.
All post-1956 cases authorize direction of the verdict for the party
with the burden of proof where the other party establishes the propo-
nent's case by admitting "'either in his pleadings or by counsel in open
court or in his individual testimony on trial the truth of the basic facts
upon which the claim of the proponent rests.'"6 In the most common
admission case the opponent admits the prima facie case of the party
with the burden of proof and interposes an affirmative defense that he
fails to support evidentially7 or that is legally insufficient to relieve
liability.8 Another recurrent situation that triggers the right of the party
with the burden of proof to a directed verdict is where a plaintiff in a
negligence action testifies to facts that clearly establish contributory
negligence?
Stewart v. Gilmore'0 is an admission case in a somewhat different
vein but one which underscores the necessity of preserving the availabil-
ity of the directed verdidt to the party with the burden of proof. In
42B W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1075 (Wright ed.
1961).
For a description of the state of the law before 1956, see authorities cited notes 18, 31, & 40
infra.
'Charles F. Curry & Co. v. Hedrick, 378 S.W.2d 522, 531 (Mo. 1964) (per curiam); accord,
Coulthard v. Keenan, 256 Iowa 890, 129 N.W.2d 597 (1964); Vincent v. Raffety, 344 S.W.2d 293
(Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Smith v. Burleson, 9 N.C. App. 611, 177 S.E.2d 451 (1970).
7See, e.g., Lansdale Clothes, Inc. v. Wright, 217 Ga. 817, 125 S.E.2d 502 (1962); Acceptance
Corp. v. Snider, 128 Ind. App. 447, 149 N.E.2d 698 (1958) (en banc).
'See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pine Coal Co., 414 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. 1967); Auffenberg v.
Hafley, 457 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970) (per curiam); Somerville v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151
W. Va. 709, 155 S.E.2d 865 (1967).
9See, e.g., Mies v. Twietmeyer, 193 Kan. 97, 392 P.2d 118 (1964).
"-323 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1963).
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Stewart, a black sharecropper in Mississippi brought suit against his
white employer, alleging that the defendant had pistol-whipped the
plaintiff without provocation and forced him to flee with his family from
Mississippi to Louisiana. The plaintiff's testimony at trial substantiated
the allegations of the complaint. The defendant also testified, admitting
that he had indeed struck the plaintiff and chased him from a store. No
suggestion of legal provocation appeared anywhere in the evidence.
After denying the plaintiffs motion for a directed verdict, the trial judge
sent the case to the jury.
The jury deliberated for two hours before returning to the court-
room to inquire of the judge whether they could find for the plaintiff
without awarding damages. After further instructions they retired
again, returning shortly thereafter with a verdict for the defendant. On
appeal the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and directed the trial
judge on remand to enter a judgment non obstante veredicto for the
plaintiff, leaving open the questions of damages and whether the defen-
dant had actually forced the plaintiff to flee Mississippi." Had the
appellate court been of the opinion that a verdict could never be directed
for the party with the burden of proof, it would have been almost
impotent to correct an obvious injustice precipitated by jury prejudice. 12
In at least one other situation the courts appear unanimous in their
approval of directing verdicts in favor of parties with the burden of
persuasion. "[A] verdict may be directed in favor of the party having
the burden of proof. . . where the controlling evidence is documentary,
and its interpretation and construction a matter of law for the court, and
leads to but one conclusion ... ,."I For example, in Commerce Trust
Co. v. Howard,4 the plaintiff sued on a surety contract, presenting as
evidence the contract itself, the account cards of the principal debtor
showing loans made and amounts due, and supportive retail installment
contracts and chattel mortgages. The defendants did not contradict or
"Id. at 392. One rather startling feature of this case is that apparently the plaintiff failed to
move for a directed verdict at trial. Thus the court seems to hold that such a motion is not always
a necessary prerequisite for a judgment n.o.v.
120f course the court could have ordered a new trial. But there is no guarantee, especially in
a situation such as this, that the second jury will be any less prejudicial than the first. Moreover,
the new-trial route is much more costly to the litigants and to the judicial system than the directed
verdict or judgment n.o.v.
'"Acceptance Corp. v. Snider, 128 Ind. App. 447,-, 149 N.E.2d 698, 699 (1958) (en banc);
accord, Dr. Pepper Fin. Corp. v. Cooper, 215 Ga. 598, 112 S.E.2d 585 (1960); Charles F. Curry
& Co. v. Hedrick, 378 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. 1964) (per curiam).
1'429 S.W.2d 702 (Mo. 1968).
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deny the authenticity or correctness of these documents and the court
held that a verdict should have been directed for the plaintiff.5
The documentary-evidence cases may be viewed as nothing more
than subspecies of the admission cases. If the opponent does not deny
the correctness or authenticity of the documents, he is deemed to have
admitted them. But something more may be involved. At least one case
has suggested that even though the correctness of the documents is
denied, "[c]lear, uncontradicted, self-consistent, and unimpeached busi-
ness records of a party having initial production and persuasion burdens
may suffice for a directed verdict in his favor."' 6 Thus it is possible that
some courts would require a litigant to contradict or impeach documen-
tary evidence in order to avoid direction of the verdict for the party with
the burden of proof.1 7
But the most spirited controversy in this area in the last fifteen
years has arisen in the situation in which the proponent's evidence is oral
and uncontradicted and unimpeached by other evidence."s Courts that
deny the trial judge's power to direct for the party with the burden of
proof under such circumstances stress the historical separation of the
functions of judge and jury. It is for the jury and the jury alone, these
courts say, to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. And if the judge
takes the case from the jury and finds for the proponent as a matter of
law on the basis of uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence, he usurps
the jury's authority.
Missouri, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina have been the leading
advocates of this view in the past fifteen years. The Missouri courts have
employed very strong language in several cases against ever directing a
verdict in favor of the party with the burden of proof in the absence of
a judicial admission by the opposing party or unless the evidence is
documentary and uncontroverted. "Where the evidence is oral . . . the
party having the burden of proof on a controverted [in other words, not
admitted] issue of fact is not entitled to a directed verdict as his adver-
15Accord, J.R. Watkins Co. v. Smith, 421 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
"Watkins Prods., Inc. v. Keane, 185 Neb. 424, 427, 176 N.W.2d 231, 232 (1970).
17Contra, Hales & Hunter Co. v. Wyatt, 239 Ark. 19, 386 S.W.2d 704 (1965); State ex rel.
Hickory County v. Davis, 302 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1958).
"For discussion of this problem before 1956, see Sunderland, Directing A Verdict for the
Party Having the Burden of Proof, II MICH. L. REV. 198 (1913); Note, A Query About Plaintiff s
Right to a Directed Verdict As To Defendant's Negligence, II MD. L. REV. 44 (1950); Note,
Practice and Procedure-Demurrer to Evidence-Directing Verdict in Favor of Party Having




sary is entitled to have the trier of the facts pass on the credibility of
the witnesses and the weight of their testimony, even though the testi-
mony be uncontradicted."' 9 Parsons Construction Co. v. Missouri Pub-
lic Service Co. 2 perhaps best demonstrates the steadfastness with which
the Missouri courts cling to this view. The contention was there made
that allowing the jury to reject uncontradicted and unimpeached evi-
dence without restraint results in verdicts founded upon nothing more
than jury passion and prejudice. This contention, said the court, is based
upon the "erroneous assumption that the verdict against the party hav-
ing the burden of proof must have 'tangible support' in the evidence.''2
The language of the Pennsylvania decisions is equally forceful. 22
North Carolina is likewise insistent that "the judge cannot direct
a verdict upon any controverted issue in favor of the party having the
burden of proof 'even though the evidence is uncontradicted.' ",23 North
Carolina, however, does not rely solely upon the distinction between the
functions of judge and jury to support its position. The state's no-
comment rule, which forbids the trial judge from opining as to "whether
a fact is fully or sufficiently proved, '2 4 is advanced as an additional
justification for the conclusion that a proponent is never entitled to a
directed verdict in the absence of an admission or documentary evi-
dence. 25
Such restrictive holdings are quite anachronistic. Their logic would
have been cogent at a time when juries were composed of citizens per-
sonally knowledgable of the facts of the case. But under the conditions
of modern-day jurisprudence, where only those ignorant of the facts
surrounding a lawsuit are qualified to become jurors, such logic lacks
vitality. Today jurors can decide controversies rationally only on the
basis of evidence presented in the courtroom. If they be allowed to
disregard such evidence, their verdict rests on speculation alone. Thus,
'Hoerath v. Sloan's Moving & Storage Co., 305 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Mo. 1957) (per curiam);
accord, Boyd v. Margolin, 421 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1967); Nichols v. Blake, 418 S.W.2d 188 (Mo.
1967).
2425 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. 1968).
"Id. at 172.
"See, e.g., Varallo v. Pennsylvania R.R., 424 Pa. 1, 3, 225 A.2d 552, 553 (1967): "It is well
established that it is error for a trial court to direct a verdict for a plaintiff whose claim rests upon
oral testimony even if that testimony is uncontradicted and unimpeached, because the credibility
of the witnesses is always for the jury."
2'Cutts v. Casey, 278 N.C. 390, 417-18, 180 S.E.2d 297, 311 (1971).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, Rule 51(a) (1969).
"Cutts v. Casey, 278 N.C. 390, 180 S.E.2d 297 (1971).
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as a New York court long ago stated, "If juries are permitted to dis-
credit or disregard [uncontradicted and unimpeached] testimony, there
is no safety in the administration of justice, and parties might just as
well let the result of a litigation abide the cast of a die, or a game of
chance."26
Moreover, allowing a judge to direct a verdict for the party with
the burden of proof where his evidence is uncontradicted and unim-
peached in no way interferes with the province of the jury. All the judge
decides in such circumstances is that on the evidence presented no jury,
acting rationally, could fail to render a verdict for the movant. Once the
judge decides this, no issue of fact exists and, therefore, the jury has no
function to perform. The judge's decision "does indeed involve accept-
ing (not assuming) credibility, but this is no more and no less a matter
of law than deciding that only one inference may be drawn from the
evidence, or that evidence assumed to be credible does not amount to a
'scintilla,' etc."' 27 For this reason, North Carolina's reliance on its no-
comment rule fails to bolster its conclusion that a directed verdict for
the proponent is never appropriate on uncontradicted evidence. "The
no-comment rule is one designed to prevent a judge's intrusion on the
fact finding functions of the jury after he has decided the prior question
of law: 'Is there a genuine issue of fact requiring jury determination?'
It speaks not at all to the basis for deciding this preliminary question. '28
Most recent decisions recognize the above objections to the restric-
tive position exemplified by the Missouri, Pennsylvania, and North
Carolina cases and agree generally that uncontradicted and unim-
peached oral evidence may form a predicate for directing a verdict in
favor of the party with the burden of proof.29 Of course, the uncontrad-
2'Seibert v. Erie Ry., 49 Barb. 583, 586 (N.Y. 1867).
212 A. MCINTOsH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1488.20, at 25 (Supp.
1970) (footnote omitted).
21Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
2
'See, e.g., Chicago, R. Is. & Pac. Ry. v. Howell, 401 F.2d 752 (10th Cir. 1968); Gatenby v,
Altoona Aviation Corp., 407 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1963); Campbell v. Prudential Ins. Co., 16 III. App.
2d 65, 147 N.E.2d 404 (1958); Bessman v. Harding, - Iowa -, 176 N.W.2d 129 (1970);
Virginia Collins Coal Co. v. Byrge, 340 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1960); Clark v. McCune, 361 P.2d 219
(Okla. 1961) (per curiam).
It should be noted that considerable disagreement exists among the federal courts of appeals
over whether the state or the federal standard applies in a diversity case to determine the sufficiency
of the evidence to go to the jury. Compare Gross v. Southern Ry., 446 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1971):
Weeks v. Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 418 F.2d 1035 (10th Cir. 1969); Gatenby v. Altoona Aviation
Corp., 407 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1968); Safeway Stores v. Fannan, 308 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1962): United
States Fire Ins. Co. v. Milner Hotels, 253 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1958), with Gullett v. St. Paul Fire
[Vol. 50
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icted testimony must lead to but one rational conclusion and clearly
establish the proponent's case. Thus it has been held that though the
proponent's uncontradicted evidence clearly establishes a lack of rea-
sonable care on the part of his opponent, a directed verdict on the issue
of liability is not appropriate unless similarly strong evidence also estab-
lishes some injury and that the injury was proximately caused by the
opponent's negligence.3 1
But even though the evidence be uncontradicted and lead to only
one rational conclusion, a directed verdict for the party with the burden
of proof may still be inappropriate. Various factors may so taint the
trustworthiness of the evidence as to make it improper for the judge to
accept it. One such factor is the interest of the witness in the litigation .3
At least one court within the last fifteen years has given this factor
controlling effect, holding that "'a verdict upon an issue of fact should
not be directed in favor of the party who has the burden of proof with
respect thereto, unless such fact . . is established by the undisputed
testimony of one or more disinterested witnesses and different minds
cannot reasonably draw different conclusions from such testimony.' "32
Most recent decisions, however, give little weight to the interest of the
witness in deciding whether the judge may find for the party with the
burden of proof as a matter of law. 33
Modern courts are much more concerned with other circumstances
which may give rise to conflicting inferences as to testimonial trustwor-
thiness. Whether the testimony is contrary to reason, scientific facts, or
common knowledge; whether it contains internal inconsistencies;
whether it is equivocal; and whether it is improbable are the questions
the post-1956 cases most frequently ask in adjudging the trial court's
acceptance or rejection of the proponent's uncontradicted and unim-
& Marine Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1971); Dean v. Southern Ry., 327 F.2d 757 (6th Cir.
1964). Only a definitive statement by the Supreme Court will correct this difficulty. See Moore,
A Century Old Problem: Federal or State Law As Determinative of a Directed Verdict in a Federal
Court, 4 U. RICH. L. REv. 282 (1970); Comment, Directed Verdicts and the Right to Trial By
Jury in Federal Courts, 42 TEXAS L. REv. 1053 (1964).
"Hedges v. Conder, - Iowa -, 166 N.W.2d 844 (1969); Peroti v. Williams, 258 Md.
663, 267 A.2d 114 (1970); Ferguson v. Boyd, 448 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1970). But see Houchins v.
Cocci, 43 Ill. App. 2d 433, 193 N.E.2d 597 (1963).
"The older cases considering this factor are collected in Annot., 72 A.L.R. 27 (1931).
I2Spink v. Mourton, 235 Ark. 919, 922, 362 S.W.2d 665, 667 (1962) (emphasis added).
"See,, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pine Coal Co., 414 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. 1967); Ferdinand v.
Agriculturhl Ins. Co., 22 N.J. 482, 126 A.2d 323 (1956); Clark v. McCune, 361 P.2d 219 (Okla.
1961) (per curiam).
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peached evidence. In Hager v. Over,34 for example, the court affirmed
the trial judge's refusal to direct a verdict for the plaintiff because her
evidence, though uncontradicted, was so equivocal that it would not
have been unreasonable for the fact finder not to have been persuaded
by it.3
Another case illustrating the modern-day approach to the question
of whether the proponent is entitled to a directed verdict upon uncon-
tradicted evidence is Ferdinand v. Agricultural Ins. Co.36 There the
plaintiffs' story was that a thief had broken into their car as it sat
outside a Florida motel and removed all the valuable pieces of jewelry
contained in a jewelry box, leaving behind costume jewelry of trivial
worth. A deputy sheriff partially corroborated this testimony, stating
that when he arrived on the scene after the alleged theft one of the
windows in the plaintiffs' car was shattered and jewelry was scattered
over the car's interior. The defendant, insurer of the jewelry, offered no
evidence and the trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiffs. The
intermediate appellate court affirmed.37 The supreme court noted that
"where the uncontradicted testimony of a witness, interested or other-
wise, is unaffected by any conflicting inferences to be drawn from it and
is not improbable, extraordinary or surprising in its nature, or there is
no other ground for hesitating to accept it as the truth, there is no reason
for denying the verdict dictated by such evidence . . . ."I However,
the court could understand neither why 12,000 dollars' worth of jewelry
would be left unguarded overnight in a parked car nor why a thief would
pause long enough to segregate expensive items from those less expen-
sive, and thus reversed the trial court's decision, saying that plaintiffs'
evidence was too improbable to form the basis of a directed verdict.
One final circumstance may influence a court in granting or deny-
ing the proponent's motion for a directed verdict. At least one court
within the last fifteen years has suggested that the proponent's uncon
tradicted evidence must be capable of contradiction in order to form the
predicate for a directed verdict.39 And while most courts would not go
to this extreme, the fact that the evidence is capable of contradiction
3'453 S.W.2d 752 (Ky. 1970).
'Cf Ulrych v. General Accident Group, 3 Mich. App. 268, 142 N.W.2d 36 (1966).
'22 N.J. 482, 126 A.2d 323 (1956).
'Ferdinand v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 40 N.J. Super. 1, 122 A.2d 1 (1956).
'-22 N.J. at 498, 126 A.2d at 332.




may persuade a court to be less strict in requiring unquestionable
trustworthiness.
Few legitimate objections can be advanced against the rule allowing
directed verdicts in favor of the party with the burden of proof on
uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence. Some commentators have
viewed the rule with reservation, fearing that courts might expand it to
cover cases in which the proponent's evidence is contradicted but only
by evidence of minor probative force." Apparently such fears were
based upon cases tending to equate the requirements for motions for
directed verdicts with those for motions for new trials. 1 The experience
of the last fifteen years, however, has demonstrated that the courts will
not take so large a step. Though some courts have stated that the
proponent should be granted a directed verdict whenever a verdict
against him could never stand, the requirement that the proponent's
evidence be uncontradicted has not been abandoned.
4 2
The rule allowing directed verdicts for parties with the burden of
proof on uncontradicted evidence has also been challenged on the
ground that the trial judge may not be able to identify all valid indica-
tions of evidential untrustworthiness that might be credited by the jury.
The judge, however, may direct a verdict for the proponent only when
the evidence is particularly persuasive. Furthermore, if the judge enter-
tains the slightest doubt of the truthfulness of the uncontradicted evi-
dence, he should leave the case to the jury.
Thus, the weight of recent authority and the better reasoning vest
the trial judge with power to take direct control of litigation in clearly
delineated situations and direct the verdict in favor of the party with the
burden of proof. But since it is unanimously agreed that seldom will a
proponent so persuasively make out his case as to be entitled to a verdict
as a matter of law, one may well ask how the availability of such a
procedure substantially improves the delivery of justice. The obvious
response is that the procedure will insure that justice is done in the
admittedly few situations in which its use is appropriate. Less obviously
but more importantly, the availability of the directed verdict in favor
4See, e.g., Note, The Power of the Court to Determine Witness Credibility: A Problem in
Directing a Verdict for the Proponent of the Evidence, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 217 (1958).
"It has been suggested that such cases are not as radical as they seem because of the similarity
in various jurisdictions of the tests for directed verdicts and new trials. James, Sufficiency of the
Evidence and Jury Control Devices Available Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. REv. 218, 233-34 (1961).
"See, e.g., Chicago, R. Is. & Pac. Ry. v. Howell, 401 F.2d 752 (10th Cir. 1968).
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